Friday, September 05, 2008

Trichet Announces New Rules For ECB Funding

Time To Stop The Abuse?


The ECB and the Spanish banks are back in the news, following the decision by ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet to take advantage of this week's regular interest rate press conference to announce a number of funding rule changes affecting European bank access to ECB liquidity provision. These changes will affect all those financial entities that have developed an excessive dependence on the cheap "you can see my wallet if I can see your securities" funding which has been available up to now from the bank. The changes were judged by many analysts to have been slightly more radical than expected, and bank stocks in the Eurozone and the UK fell sharply on the news.

Irish and British banks fell the most in European trading after the ECB announcement. Anglo Irish Bank had fallen 12 percent by Friday afternoon. HBOS, a U.K. mortgage lender that has accessed ECB funding via its Irish operation, was down 8.2 percent over the same period, while Barclays, the UK's third-biggest lender, dropped 9 percent. In Spain Banco Sabadell fell 4.4 percent, Banco Santander, the country's largest bank, sank 6.1 percent and Bankinter SA fell 7.7 percent.

Since the UK is not a member of the eurozone, this fall in bank shares may give us some sort of measure of the kind of "abuse" which many have long thought was occurring, but which was not evident due to the lack of transparency surrounding such operations. Other European banks who were "badly affected" by the news were the Swiss bank UBS, and some smaller regional banks such as Erste Group in Austria and Piraeus Bank in Greece.

Ireland in the Forefront

What may well surprise many readers of this blog - although not perhaps after reading this post yesterday - is that it seems to be Ireland and not Spain which has been at the heart of most of the abuse (certainly you wouldn't have known this from the number of articles in the popular press which have been busy pointing the finger at the Spanish banks in recent weks though). Last week the ECB lent a total of 467 billion euros to European banks, or should I say to banks which have some sort of operating facility inside the 15-country euro area - although with banks like HBOS, UBS and even Australia's Macqarie on the list, the term "European" is getting to be a bit stretched - and in return had been accepting a broader range of collateral to back the loans than has been the case at Bank of England. Such collateral may include bonds with credit ratings five levels below AAA as well as asset-backed securities. The existence of this policy differential seems to have prompted a pretty motley crew of non eurozone financial firms to create bonds of variable quality solely and exclusively for use as collateral for ECB borrowing.

But when we look at how this money lent by the ECB has been allocated, then even more eyebrows may be raised on learning that lending to the much castigated Spanish banks has been "only" running at around 49 billion euros (as of July), while lending to Irish banks reached 44.1 billion euros according to data from the Irish central bank in Dublin. I say only, since everyone is aware that Spain's banks have a sizeable problem, so if a facility has been created to help them I would have thought that it is only natural that they use it. Thus I am not sure why this use by the Spanish banks has been being called "abuse", since a sizeable chunk of the lending has been going to Spain's hard pressed savings banks (see below), so I think it is worth asking what exactly it is they are supposed to do? Or put it another way, if people really are so concerned about Spain, then maybe a more appropriate question is why the ECB aren't doing more to help? Certainly US banks don't seem to be labouring under this kind of difficulty with the Federal Reserve, although of course it is precisely this position which has attracted criticism from a chorus of European commentators. Rather than talking about abuse in Spain, perhaps it might be more interesting to ask why we only have a temporary and transitional facility for what is clearly now a longer term and structural problem in the Spanish banking system.

To put what has been happening in perspective, since Ireland is about one tenth the size of Spain, it is as if the Irish banks had been accessing some 440 billion euros in funds. And things only get worse when we come down to the details, since about half of the funding from the ECB has been going of to the Dublin-based units of lenders from outside Ireland, according to analyst Eamonn Hughes at Goodbody Stockbrokers.

HBOS and Barclays are just two of the British banks that have been borrowing from the ECB. Earlier this year it emerged Macquarie Bank had set up a deal backed by Australian car loans specifically for use at the ECB. But the whistle really was blown in mid August when the UK's largest building society, Nationwide, got a lot of media coverage for saying it was planning to expand into Ireland to take advantage of "funding opportunities".

So the first thing to have clear is that the real abuse of the ECB funding has not been coming from Spain, and that access to these funds by Spanish banks has been more or less policed by Bank of Spain Governor Miguel Fernández Ordóñez and his team, who have attempted - as he explained in June in his appearance before the Economy and Taxation Commission of the Spanish Congress - to ensure that participation in eurosystem fundings rise "without going far beyond the "key" subscription of the BoS to the ECB capital" (which is 7.55%). And if Spain's banks have recently gone increasingly beyond this level (10.3% of total loans in July) then this is surely more to do with the pressing needs of Spain's savings banks sector (who really do need liquidity, see below), than it is with any organised system of abuse. But be that as it may, it is Spain's banking sector who will take the lions share of the hit from yesterday's decision, since while in some other countries the ECB funding may well have been considered to be mere "froth on the daydream", for Spain's struggly banking system the lifeline is likely to turn into a life and death issue.

The Measures Themselves


Trichet announced a battery of measures yesterday, all of them having one feature in common: they will increase the cost of using asset-backed securities to obtain ECB funds. Access will also now specifically exclude deals involving underlying mortgages or other loans not denominated in euros.

The changes - which will take effect as of February 1 2009 - include increases in the average “haircuts” applied to asset-backed securities. A haircut is the amount deducted from the market value of a product when judging its value as collateral. In future, a blanket 12 per cent haircut will apply to all securities, instead of the earlier sliding scale of between 2 and 18 per cent. There will be penalties for asset-backed securities valued using computer models and for unsecured bank bonds. Banks will in fact have to take an initial markdown of 5 percent on any ABS that has been valued using a computer model. At the same time restrictions already in place on banks using assets they themselves had created were extended to stop banks using assets from issues to which they had offered currency hedges or liquidity support above a certain level.

Analysts at Barclays Capital are quoted as saying that the extra haircuts would mean banks might have to post an additional €25bn-€45bn of securities for collateral purposes. The general opinion is that the changes will make it less attractive for banks to use asset-backed securities as collateral and will certainly push up the overall cost of borrowing funds from the ECB.


The asset class which will be most affected by the changes are ABS with a residual maturity of up to one year, which currently have a haircut of just 2 percent. In these cases, instead of receiving 98 euros in exchange for a security with a face value of 100 euros, banks will often now receive just 83.60 euros.


Spanish Savings Banks Will Be Affected

Spanish savings banks, such as La Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo (CAM), are likely to be hit quite hard by the new rules, and this on the face of it seems to be most unfair, since if there has been abuse of the earlier ECB rules it is hardly towards this quarter that we should be looking given the now evidently parlous state of their balance sheets. The savings banks accounted for almost 70 percent of the total growth in funds borrowed by Spanish financial institutions from the ECB over the last year, according to a research note from Banco Santander. Spain-based financial institutions borrowed 49 billion euros ($71.14 billion) from the ECB as in July, up from 18 billion over the same time last year, according to Bank of Spain data (so the savings banks have had approximately 21 billion euros in the last 12 months). Borrowing by Spain savings banks accounted for 4.4 percent of the 467 billion euro total funding from the ECB last week, up from 0.9 percent last year, according to the Santander research note issued yesterday. Regular Spanish banks increased their participation to 5.6 percent, from 4.6 percent.

Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo, which is based in Spain's Valencia region, has now been put on a watch list by ratings agency Standard and Poor's, and S&P's could downgrade the bank by as many as two notches due to the fast deterioration of its asset quality. Spanish RMBS's are currently trading in the secondary market at levels which vary between Libor plus 170 and Libor plus 350 basis points.

And this brings us to the heart of the question. Basically, either what has been happening recently is one of the most brillant recent pieces of "counter information" (or smokescreening) or someone somewhere really quite important just hasn't grasped what is actually going on. Maybe the fact is that the attention recently being focused on Spain's banks wasn't in fact to distract attention away from abuses which have been taking place in Ireland and elsewhere (yes, I am sure there are elsewheres, since total lending is, after all 476 billion euros), but the fuss about abuse could have been a way of diverting attention from the fact that some kind of longer term support system for the Spanish banks is being put in place (this is what I hope is happening, but there really is no visible evidence to support my hope). You see, if Spanish banks really are, as some are urging, going to have to "mark to market" and thus pay up to 350 basis points over 3 month Libor, then as they rollover the stock of existing cedulas over the next 5 years (which are financing existing mortgages, remember), there is just no way they can continue to charge the kind of basis points over 1 year Libor that their mortgage customers are currently paying, which means there will have to be another substantial hike in Spanish mortgages payments, over and above the upward movement we have seen in euro Libor itself. And we have already seen the extent of the damage that is being caused to the Spanish real economy with mortgage rates at their present levels. Do we really want to get to find out what would happen if everybody had to pay 200 to 300 basis points on top of this? I don't know about anyone else, but personally I could happily live out the rest of my life without getting to know the answer to this question. This is certainly the kind of "reality check" I could most definitely live without.

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Spain At A Glance January 2008

Welcome to the Spain Economy Watch Blog. Below you will find the normal chronological blog posts. But first we would like to present some charts which provide background data and which we hope will help the first time reader better assess and get to grips with the argument being presented here. The Spanish economy is now entering quite a significant economic downturn, and with it Spanish society one of those decisive turning points in its history. What happens next is bound to represent a tremendous challenge of the Spanish institutions and the Spanish people. I can only express the sincere hope that they will prove able to rise to the measure of the day. We now present charts for longer term Spanish GDP Growth, construction activity, house prices, inflation and interest rates, cement output, private domestic consumption, retail sales, immigration, fertility and age structure the rise and initiation of the decline in the 25 to 50 age group. Basically we hope you will find this background data useful in assessing the argument which we are presenting on this blog, which is basically the principal reason why Spain has not had a recssion since 1993 was the existence of negative interest rates via the Eurosystem between the spring of 2002 and the autumn of 2006. This phenomenon also coincided with a high point in Spain's demographic evolution where the 25 to 49 age group constituted a virtually unprecedented anywhere 40% of the total population. The combination of these two together served to fuel one of the longest running and strongest housing booms in history. It is this boom which is now in the process of unwinding and correcting itself. Please click on thumbnails for better viewing.

If you look at being presented here, you may well reach the same conclusion as I have that Spain is heading rapidly towards recession. There was already some indication of a slow-down in the third quarter of 2007. Quarter on quarter growth was 0.7% down from 0.9% in quarter two. More significantly perhaps was the fact that the slowdown was lead by a deceleration in domestic demand.

When we come to the fourth quarter we should expect this downward trend in domestic consumption to continue, and this is exactly what we are seeing in the data, first with retail sales, which are now steadily going down month by month, and then in the weakening of construction, and the fact that industrial output started to contract in December (going by the PMI).



Private domestic consumption peaked back in 2004/5, and the rates of increase have been slowing steadily ever since and we should expect this trend to continue. Even more to the point, in Q3 2007 private domestic consumption only grew at 0.37% over Q2, and we have to go back to Q1 2003 to get a slower rate than this.


Also there hasn't been anything approaching a recession in Spain since 1993. We should be asking ourselves why that is. The answer is simple enough. In principle Spain avoided recession in 2002 due to the availability of ultra-cheap (negative) interest rates from the ECB. Should we now be expecting a protracted period of downside underperformance after all that upside overperformance.


Finally two demographic charts. Firstly Spanish fertility. This gives us an idea of the longer term domestic demand for housing. Lastly, a chart for the 25 to 49 age group. This group peaked in 2006, at around what as far as I can see is the highest proportion for any society to date of 40%. Is this just a coincidence, or does it have additional significance in all this?


2008 Forecasts:The Spanish government in December cut its economic growth forecast for Spain in 2008 to 3.1 % down from the previous 3.3% estimate. The direction of the adjustment is certainly the right one, but the value seems unrealistically high. The IMF were forecasting 2.7% in their October World Economic Outlook, but all of this is in the process of constant adjustment. The OECD dropped their expectation from 2.7% to 2.5%, also in December. The Economist Intelligence Unit don't really stick their neck out too far, merely indicating that "GDP growth is expected to slow to an average of just over 2% over 2008-12, from 3.9% in 2006. As a result of high indebtedness on the part of households and companies, domestic consumer and investment demand will grow less than in recent years." More interestingly the EU Commission is forecasting 3% growth driven by a 2.75% increase in private consumption (which seems rather high to me) and a 3% growth in Gross Fixed Capital Formation driven largely by government investment in infrastructure projects which seems much more realistic.

My own view is rather more downside than all of this. A lot really depends on factors outside Spain's control, such as the growth in demand in other European countries and the arrival of tourists across the year. However since I feel that crunch time for Spain is going to be coming in the midst of a more general European slowdown - the OECD for example cut anticipated eurozone growth from 2.6% to 1.9% in December, so I doubt this climate will be too favourable. Still the Spanish government will be spending on civil engineering projects as fast as it possibly can, so I will go for 1.5% growth in 2008, with downside risk, and slower growth to come as we enter 2009 and 2010. I think Spain will definitely see negative growth in at least one quarter, and as this may well turn out to be Q1, this forecast may well be subject to downward revision as and when we get that data. Evidently everything depends on whether or not we get a hard landing here, but to decide on that difficult topic we need to see a lot more real data.

This blog will not have daily update posts, unless events start to move at a pace which makes those desireable. There will be data updates from time to time, and extensive monthly reports, the next of which will be at the start of February. I also recommend my two recent extenisive summary posts:
Some Background Charts On the Banking and Construction Crisis Developing in Spain
Spanish Consumer Confidence, Inflation, 3 month libor etc